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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
An appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. 
The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint ruling that the home 
owners in the Quail Point Subdivision had properly terminated restrictive covenants that had 
been filed in 1973. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2-2(4), UTAH CODE ANN. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court rule correctly that covenants that provide for amendment 
"in whole or in part" could be terminated by a majority vote of the affected home owners? 
2. Did the trial court rule correctly that the home owners vote that culminated on 
January 1, 2004 was effective to terminate the covenants? 
1 
Case No. 20041041 
Trial Court No. 040902545CV 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
These issues present a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Canyon 
Meadows Home Owners Assoc, v. Wasatch City, 2001 UT. App. 414. 
PRESERVATION FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 125). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs ask the court to not only interpret certain restrictive covenants, but also a 
previous opinion rendered by the Utah Supreme Court, Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT. 16 
{Swenson 7), involving these parties and the covenants. Barbara and David Swenson ("the 
Swensons") seek to nullify the vote of a majority of the home owners in the Quail Point 
Subdivision located in Salt Lake County terminating the restrictive covenants that had been 
filed in 1973. This is the second action commenced by the Swensons seeking to preserve the 
covenants. Judge Henriod ruled that the covenants could be terminated by a majority vote 
and that the vote, which culminated on January 1,2004, was valid. The Swensons' 
complaint was dismissed. They appeal from that adverse ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L On July 9, 1973, restrictive covenants for the Quail Point Subdivision were 
filed with the Salt Lake County Recorder in Book 3368 at Page 429 through 432. 
2. In 1997, Dave Erickson ("Erickson") began building a structure on his 
2 
property to be used as a storage and hobby shed. The Swensons filed suit in the Third 
District Court alleging that Erickson's shed violated the restrictive covenants and obtained an 
injunction prohibiting him from maintaining the shed on his property. 
3. After the injunction was entered, the subdivision residents voted 
overwhelmingly to terminate the covenants. A notice of termination was recorded on 
October 6, 1997. The trial court dismissed the case and the Swensons appealed. 
4. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held in Swenson 1 that the attempt by the 
home owners to terminate the covenants was ineffective since the covenants specifically 
provided that they could be terminated by a majority vote of subdivision owners only at 
specific ten year intervals. 
5. The case was remanded to the District Court and a permanent injunction was 
entered on August 31, 2000 prohibiting Erickson from keeping the shed on his lot. 
6. Erickson promptly removed the shed. 
7. Commencing in December 2003 and culminating on January 1, 2004, the 
subdivision lot owners again voted to terminate the restrictive covenants. Forty two out of 
52 lots and 76 out of 90 lot owners voted to terminate the covenants. A Notice of 
Termination was recorded on March 26, 2004 with the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
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8. The Swensons participated in the election, campaigned against termination, 
were present while the votes were cast and even suggested the time of the vote (12 noon to 
2:00 p.m. on January 1, 2004), all without voicing any objection to the vote. 
9. Neither Erickson or Dave Limberg ("Limberg") were in the process of 
constructing any shed or improvement on their lots; nevertheless, the Swensons singled them 
out as the sole defendants in this litigation merely because their properties abut. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE RESIDENTS HAD A RIGHT TO TERMINATE 
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
Restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and are strictly construed in favor of 
the free and unrestricted use of property. View Condominium Owners Assoc, v. MISCO, 
L.L.C., 2004 UT App. 104. The covenants in questions must be construed in favor of 
Erickson and Limberg. 
Since the property owners had the authority to changed the covenants "in whole or in 
part," it seems ridiculous for Plaintiffs to argue that if the property owners had changed the 
covenants by eliminating the renewal provision (thus effectively terminating them on 
January 1, 2004), that would have been okay, but voting to terminate the covenants directly 
was not. In L.R. French v. Diamond HillJarvis Civic League, 724 S.W. 2.d 921 (Tex. 
4 
App.-Fort Worth 1987), the court, interpreting similar language in restrictive covenants, held 
that the right of the majority of property owners to amend restrictions included the power to 
totally abolish them. The court stated, "the majority of the owners had the right to amend 
the restrictions even to the point of destroying or removing them." Id. at 924. 
When the Supreme Court considered this matter in Swenson 7, it could have saved a 
lot of time by simply ruling that the covenants could not be terminated. Since it did not do 
that, it may be assumed that the court rejected Swensons' claim that termination was not 
permitted.1 
II 
THE VOTE ON JANUARY 1, 2004 FOLLOWED THE SUPREME COURT'S 
DIRECTIONS AND WAS VALID AND BINDING 
In Swenson 7, the Supreme Court cited the covenants with emphasis as follows: 
looking at the plain language of the article, the covenants are to be "automatically 
extended . . . unless by a vote of a majority of the then owners" (emphasis by the 
court). 
The Court went on to state: 
Therefore, the owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only at such time 
as the covenants are due for extension. The last such time was January 1, 1994. We 
assume that the next such time will be on January 1, 2004 (emphasis added). 
1
 The court noted that "The owners attempted termination of the restrictive covenants is 
without effect." Swenson 7 at 815 (emphasis added). 
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The court was particularly concerned that the vote had to be by a majority of the 
"then" owners; or, in other words, those who owned lots in the subdivision on the date the 
covenants were due for extension (January 1, 2004). The best way to determine who the 
"then" lot owners were, was to have the vote on January 1, 2004, as the Supreme Court 
directed. Any vote prior to that date would be susceptible to a challenge that the vote was 
not made by the owners of lots as of January 1, 2004. 
The Supreme Court further held in Swenson 1 that even if the petition represented a 
majority of the lot owners (which it did), it was still invalid, presumably because it was not 
the action of the "then" lot owners, i.e. as of January 1, 2004. 
As directed by the Supreme Court, the vote to amend the covenants culminated on 
January 1, 2004 with 84 percent of the lot owners voting in favor. From December 28th to 
the 31st, 43 people representing 26 lots submitted proxies seeking to terminate the 
covenants. Plaintiffs* contention that the vote had to occur prior to January 1, 2004 ignores 
the clear direction from the Supreme Court that the time to amend the covenants was on 
January 1st.2 
2
 The Swensons also acknowledged that the lot owners could terminate the covenants on 
January 1st. They asked the trial court, in paragraph 2 of the prayer in their complaint (R. 06), 
to order that the covenants have automatically been renewed through January 1, 2014. Thus, 
if any renewal period runs through January 1,2014, and the covenants are renewed in 10 year 
increments, the power to terminate the covenants must also have existed on January 1, 2004. 
6 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Swenson 1 is supported by the case of 
Wallace's Fourth Southmoor Addition v. Rogers, 874 P.2d 818 (Okl. App. 1994). The trial 
court in that case, interpreting restrictive covenants similar to those in this case3, held that 
the vote to amend the covenants had to occur on January 1,1994 (the renewal date). Id. at 
819. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed (rejecting an attempt by home owners to 
modify the covenants prior to the renewal date) and stated: 
We hold the phrase "at which t ime". . . relates to "January 1, 1994"; and, the 
subsequent phrase, "for successive periods often years," refers to time periods ending 
on January 1, 1984, January 1, 1994, January 1,2004, etc. (emphasis added). Id. at 
821. 
Ill 
PLAINTIFFS1 CASES ARE INAPPOSITE 
Plaintiffs rely primarily upon two cases in support of their argument, City ofGulfport 
v. Wilson, 603 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1992) for the proposition that covenants cannot be 
terminated by a majority vote after they are automatically renewed and Mackey v. 
Armstrong, 705 So. 2d 1198 (La. App. 1997) for the proposition that there is a difference 
between a provision in covenants providing for modification and one granting the right to 
terminate. 
3
 The covenants provided for an initial 30 year term followed by successive 10 year 
renewal periods unless by a majority of the then owners of the lots, it is agreed to change said 
covenants in whole or in part. 
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Wilson involved a situation where the residents of a subdivision filed an amendment 
to the covenants approximately six months prior to the time the covenants were to be 
automatically extended. The court there held that the vote was not premature and the 
amendment was binding. The court stated that it was "reasonable" for amendments to be 
voted on and to be ratified before the expiration of the ten year period so that the covenants 
would not automatically go into effect for another ten years. The court did not state, 
however, that the vote could not occur on the renewal date. In addition, the citizens of 
Gulfport, Mississippi had not received direction from the Utah Supreme Court that the vote 
to amend the covenants should occur on January 1, 2004.4 
In Mackey, certain lot owners tried to amend covenants to make them more 
restrictive. The court there held that the law of Louisiana contemplated amendments to 
restrictive covenants that lift, rather than add, restrictions to the use of property. In that case, 
the statute provided that the covenants could be "changed in whole or in part" by the owners 
of a majority of the lots in the subdivision (language which is strikingly similar to that in this 
4
 The cases of Pearce v. Scar cello, 920 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. App. 1996) and Scholten v. 
Blackhawk Partners, 999 P.2d 393 (Ariz. App. 1995) also cited by Plaintiff similarly deal with 
votes to amend covenants that occurred prior to the renewal date. In Pearce, the court held that 
the vote would not become effective until the 10 year extension period had expired. In 
Scholten, the court allowed an amendment approved by a majority 2 Vi years into a 10 year 
renewal period to become effective at the start of the next successive period. In Swenson 1, 
however, our Supreme Court rejected an amendment that was also approved by the Quail Point 
home owners about 2 lA years into a 10 year renewal period. 
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proceeding). The lot owners attempted to add covenants that were more restrictive. The 
court there held that they could not do it, but held that an amendment may end, modify, or 
create restrictions. Thus, the Louisiana court seems to actually support Defendants' 
contention that the Quail Point covenants could be terminated by the lot owners. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' Appeal is not well taken. Erickson and Limberg constitute only two of the 
76 lot owners who voted to terminate the covenants. The property owners had the right to 
terminate the covenants and exercised that right, as directed by the Utah Supreme Court, on 
January 1,2004. 
DATED this Q_ day of May, 2005. 
J. Thomas Bowen 
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